In October 2019, when he was preparing to assume the position of high representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy, Josep Borrell said that the Union must “learn to speak the language of power.” Shortly after, in her investiture speech, Ursula von der Leyen noted that she had a “Geopolitical Commission” in mind. In the following years, spurred by the pandemic and the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Twenty-Seven have taken significant steps in that direction. However, the path to turning the EU into a geopolitical power is long, uncertain, and full of obstacles.
The EU was not born to be a geopolitical power. It is not a structured military power and its action in foreign policy is hindered by the demand for unanimity. It suffers, therefore, limitations that lead some experts to even conceptually question its nature as a geopolitical actor. However, despite Member States defending their crucial competences for decades, the common project is now in profound metamorphosis. There is no doubt that greater common capabilities are being provided and that the political will to use them is growing within the framework of the logic of stark power pulses into which the world is entering.
In the legislature that is ending, the Twenty-seven have taken unprecedented steps in the field of defense, such as the use of an EU instrument to facilitate a large shipment of weapons to Ukraine or the implementation of industry coordination mechanisms defense. Beyond Ukraine, it is worth noting that in this last five-year period of European mandate, seven joint military operations have been launched – including one of high strategic value in the Red Sea – compared to only one in the previous legislature. In the background, there is a general increase in military spending throughout the Union.
But the advances are not exclusive to the defense field. The experts consulted for this information agree in highlighting the evolution in terms of economic security and strategic autonomy. Within this framework, actions of an economic, energy and technological nature are included, such as the promotion of the indigenous microchip industry, the review of trade relations with China – to reduce dependencies or avoid delivering advanced sensitive technologies – or the reconfiguration of supplies. energy, cutting ties with Russia.
Ilke Toygür, director of the Global Policy Center and professor of European geopolitics at IE University, believes that we are facing “a change in logic.” “I think that in recent years what were once big red lines have been crossed, such as common debt in the pandemic or the shipment of weapons to Ukraine. But most importantly, even before significant specific progress, there is a shift in thinking regarding what the EU can and cannot do. “It is changing the DNA of the project.”
It is significant in this context that the leaders of Germany and France signed a column published by the newspaper this week. Financial Times which advocates reinforcing “European sovereignty”, a strong concept, defended by Paris for a long time and to which Berlin showed some reluctance by preferring more nuanced and open messages. Not anymore. An increasingly brutal world, with Russia’s violent challenge to the international order, the uncertain future of the alliance with the United States, a China dominant in key technologies and at the same time a disturbing competitor, and a worrying arc of instability in the Middle East and Africa have convinced almost everyone of the need for change.
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Richard Youngs, senior expert at the Carnegie Europe think tank, believes that “in recent years the first steps have been taken in what will be a long process of adapting the EU to the evolution of the world.” The analyst believes that “a fundamental aspect of this change is the factor of economic security, understanding international economic policy taking more into account geopolitical interests. It is in that area of confluence between the economic and the geopolitical where there is a significant evolution.”
Youngs has just published a book titled Geoliberal Europe and the test of war. The expert believes that the concept of geoliberal better adapts to the characteristics of the EU. “The EU does not act as a geopolitical power in its most traditional definition. What he is doing is adapting his liberal characteristics and values to execute more strategic or geopolitical actions.”
Luis Simón, director of the Elcano Royal Institute Office in Brussels and principal researcher, agrees in highlighting the advances in economic security strategy or in the field of defense, both with the shipment of weapons to Ukraine and with the growing industrial coordination in the sector. In this area, new mechanisms for joint purchases of weapons material stand out. It is an emblem of how the EU can move forward in defence. Not with the configuration of a structured military force, but with an improvement in coordination that increases effectiveness, reducing fragmentation, duplications, and incompatibilities.
Other significant movements on the geopolitical path is the reactivation of the EU enlargement agenda towards the East. Although these are still undefined and major reforms are necessary not only for the candidates, but also for the Twenty-Seven themselves, the mere reactivation is undoubtedly relevant.
But these important steps do not mean that the EU is close to the capacity to act as an effective geopolitical power, in a competition with giants like the United States and China that combine the greatest agility of action of a State against the union of 27 and considerable advantages in strategic capabilities, cutting-edge technologies, innovation. To try to alleviate these delays, the EU has commissioned reports from prominent Italian figures: Enrico Letta for the reform of the single market (already presented), and Mario Draghi to spur the group’s competitiveness.
“Naturally, there remain serious problems to continue moving forward, which are the same as always, the divergences between Member States,” says Simón. The requirement for political consensus is obviously a brake. “The fundamental relationship is the Franco-German one. There has been a certain rapprochement between the two, but substantial differences remain. Among them, I would highlight the conception they have of the military instrument, which Paris conceives as a tool at the service of foreign policy and strategic objectives while for Berlin it is an exclusively defensive tool, making this capital much more reluctant when it comes to use it.”
In relation to this argument, Youngs points out, for example, that the increase in military spending is not in itself an increase in geopolitical power, because it depends on the conditions and the use of those capabilities.
In general terms, Youngs considers that “the power of veto is obviously a strong factor. A change in the decision mechanism would be useful and important. But even that wouldn’t be a magic solution. There is great conceptual uncertainty about how the Union should deal with emerging problems. “We are in a moment of redefinition of the relationship between the European Union and the international system that raises fundamental problems.”
Drawing up the roadmap for an organization as complex as the EU is an enormous challenge and nothing suggests that a change in decision-making mechanisms is near. The convergence of wills is the crucial element of the path. There are no certainties in this regard and the European elections will be an important moment in the definition of political forces, between supporters of greater integration and defenders of a Europe of nations.
Toygür points out the reform of the internal market and the stimulation of competitiveness as two areas in which progress is possible and that can give a strong boost. Being a geopolitical power requires having economic vigor and the capacity for innovation. “It’s not just a question of defense. It is important to advance in this matter, and to do so while defending citizen cohesion and the position of the EU as a global economic power.” To this end, some – including France – advocate the issuance of new common debt; others—including Germany—are reticent. Here too, then, divergences must be overcome, but it is undoubtedly the most favorable terrain for the EU’s next steps on the path to becoming a geopolitical power.
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