The United States is no longer the undisputed global superpower that it was in the first decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but it remains a giant with enormous influence. The verdict of their elections therefore has the entire world in suspense. On this occasion, the dilemma between one result or another implies much greater differences than those of so many other duels (for example Obama versus Romney or McCain). In some areas they are not abysmal (China, irregular immigration) but in many others, fundamental, they are (democracy, women’s rights, climate). Europe figures in this last section. A Trump victory is a potential cataclysm for the EU and the continent in general. One from Harris would represent continued relief, but it also carries some risks, although of a completely different order of magnitude. Some considerations follow in this regard.
Trump is a political actor with strong traits of unpredictability, which he cultivates with intention. However, the general tenor of a new Trump presidency represents an existential challenge for Europe for several reasons. From the outset, everything indicates that it would short-circuit the important flow of US aid to Ukraine. Europe, despite the increase in efforts and capabilities, is not in a position to support kyiv alone. A Trump presidency could translate into a Ukrainian collapse and a Putin victory. This victorious Kremlin would cast its shadow over the continent in a context in which a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance is also likely. There is no need for Washington to withdraw from it to undermine its credibility, which is the true basis of its strength. Trump has already begun to do so during the long campaign.
Trump would also represent a very serious commercial problem, both because of the tariffs that he says he wants to impose on everyone, Europeans included, – which would imply serious damage to exports – and because of the intensification of pressure on Chinese products, which would result in an attempt of China to place more of them in the European market. This would imply a great management challenge just as storms are brewing linked to the electric car sector and other areas of green technologies.
Another category of problems would be the practical abandonment of the fight against climate change – which would in a sense represent a competitive disadvantage for certain industries in an EU that does try – or the withdrawal/weakening of certain international institutions, which are the natural forum action of an entity like the EU.
Given this scenario, some emphasize that the shockTrump could be a bitter medicine with the curative effect of spurring a more than necessary acceleration of the integration process and search for competitiveness of the European bloc. Hopefully. But that hope must be juxtaposed to the galvanizing effect that his victory would have on the large European Trumpist party. Not only would the Orbán and Fico of life be reinforced, but Meloni may be tempted to play more as the European pillar of a new transatlantic bridge than as the third leg of a fragile European table (according to his economic weight in the EU). The European Trumpist party may gain surprising followers. This dynamic would be an obstacle to European integration—and a problem for its democratic quality.
With this frankly disturbing outlook, a victory for Harris would be a huge relief. Precisely in this relief lies one of the risks for Europe of her presidency: complacency in the face of reforms that are necessary regardless of her or Trump. The EU is in a state of profound political weakness, with semi-paralyzed governments in key capitals (Berlin, Paris, Madrid), others in the hands of the extreme right. With that context, it is difficult to move forward, and a mandate from Harris could—consciously or unconsciously—create a feeling of time availability that is unrealistic. The EU is losing the global competition and needs to strengthen its ability to be in the world on its own and with its voice.
As for Ukraine, although Harris’ will is continuous, there is a serious underlying risk: if she wins but the Democrats do not control the House, it is very possible that the parliamentary blockade that has already halted US aid to kyiv for months will be reproduced. But this time it would be worse, because Ukraine is more fragile and exhausted than then, while Russia has more support than ever.
Likewise, it should be taken into account that Harris’ policy towards China will also be harsh, and will entail consequences for Europeans. And that, in climate change, although there will be ideological harmony about the need to combat it, there will be ruthless competition in the race to dominate the key technologies of the green economy.
The EU, as this newspaper recently reported, is working on contingency plans for a possible Trump victory. That is certainly necessary. However, the fundamental thing was to prepare more forcefully in the last two years, and this has only been done in part. The example of this is the ability to manufacture weapons and ammunition to sustain Ukraine and deter possible future bad ideas from Putin. This has been done, but to an insufficient extent. A Trump presidency may not end up being a catastrophe, and it may be, but may Europeans achieve the conviction and effectiveness to overcome the cataclysm. We must not lose faith. But there is no doubt that it would be better to avoid having to check these extremes: a victory for Harris – especially if it is accompanied by a Parliament in Democratic hands – would be infinitely better for Europe. Better is not synonymous with good. It will only be so if the relief does not induce complacency.
