Two temples, one Catholic and one Orthodox, and a synagogue mark the silhouette of Rashkov, a small town located in a beautiful, unpopulated landscape on the left bank of the Dniester. For centuries, the Dniester was a border river, the scene of confrontation and coexistence between the peoples who crossed these lands in different directions. Rashkov is in Transnistria, a territory of Moldova that has maintained a secessionist and pro-Russian political orientation since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
Once disputed by Poles, Lithuanians, Ottomans, Steppe Cossacks, Ukrainians, Russians and Romanians, the Dniester is today once again a “border river” between the Western world and the Russian world, which compete here to determine the course of Moldova. . Last October, by a narrow margin (0.60 tenths) this country, which is already negotiating its entry into the EU, approved to modify its Constitution to register its pro-European vocation. The future, however, is uncertain.
On January 1, Russian gas, a source of energy on both banks of the Dniester, will stop reaching them through Ukraine, which has refused to extend a transit contract with Gazprom (the state Russian gas consortium) in force. until the end of this year. The supply cut mainly affects Transnistria, which uses Russian gas to produce electricity, which is sold to Moldova at a cheap price. Transnistria’s industry, which pays taxes and exports in accordance with Moldovan legislation, is totally dependent on Russian gas; Dependence is less in the rest of Moldova, which has diversified its supply and purchases energy on the European market.
The cessation of supplies had been announced long in advance, but Moldovan leaders have been slow to start looking for alternatives. Gazprom is willing to supply gas to Moldova through other routes outside Ukraine, but to do so it requires the Moldovan gas company to pay a large arrears of debt not recognized by Chisinau. With less than two days to go before the shut-off valve closes, it is still unclear how Transnistria will be supplied. “The gas will come through other routes, through the Turkish gas pipeline and through the trans-Balkan network, but the rates will have to be raised several times,” explains a source linked to energy distribution in Moldova in Chisinau who requests anonymity.
In this poor country, with pensions of 150 euros and salaries of 350 euros per month, rate increases could be very destabilizing and for Transnistria in particular they mean the ruin of its economy. The social impact will be felt in the legislative elections to be held in mid-2025. Moldova’s political system is parliamentary.
In Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, and in Comrat, the capital of the Gagaúzia autonomy, this journalist noticed unrest over Maia Sandu’s policy and heard reproaches directed at the president for not having found alternatives to Russian supplies. The situation is not easy; In November, Russia bombed and destroyed several Ukrainian power lines that could have been used to export electricity to Transnistria, says the Moldovan energy source, who believes that “Moscow seems more interested in harming Moldova than in helping Transnistria.”
This December, Chisinau and Tiraspol, each on their own, have declared emergency situations. The Moldovan authorities spread savings standards in public lighting and in Transnistria the electric heaters have run out, which will be of little use if the local power plant stops producing due to lack of gas. On the outskirts of Tiraspol, Alexandr, a diligent retiree, saws logs and is glad to have preserved an old wood oven, despite the ridicule of his neighbors.
The biggest beneficiary of the gas supply crisis seems to be Ilán Shor, a character who today is considered the greatest danger to the pro-European liberal force that supports Maia Sandu, the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS). Shor is a local businessman on the run and sentenced to 15 years in prison for fraud and money laundering. Moldova has tried in vain to extradite him, first from Israel and then from Moscow, where he resides and from where he has implemented a scheme to interfere in the electoral processes in Moldova, based on the purchase of loyalties and votes. In the presidential elections and the referendum on pro-European politics last October, Shor experimented in the territory of Gagaúzia, whose top leader, Yevgenia Gutul, had been elected in 2023 thanks to him. The result was a scant 5% of pro-European votes.
In Russia, Shor has created structures that pay monthly sums to Gagaúzia retirees and officials who request it. “People who receive 100 euros a month from Shor do not understand why they should not take it and why I criticize it,” says Comrat deputy Alexandr Tarnavski, who claims to have lost his position as vice president of the popular assembly (parliament of Gagaúzia) for his critical attitude. “We must cut off financial flows from Shor structures. Otherwise, all elections here will be bought,” adds the deputy.
Shor was a legislator in Moldova’s parliament and mayor in the city of Orhei, and was already using gruesome small-scale vote-gettering methods when he was a local politician, says historian and anthropologist Mark Tkachuk, who was an advisor to President Vladimir Voronin. a communist defender of the integration of Moldova into Europe. Thus, Shor’s learning has found fertile ground in one of the lobbies of the Kremlin, which is betting on the destabilization of Moldova and not its reintegration.
Shor’s power is nourished by the poverty of the Moldovans and also by the mismanagement, errors and poor diplomatic skills of its leaders. Sandu refuses to sign the decree to award a position in the Government of Moldova to the head of Gagaúzia and, although she is obliged to do so by law, she does not do so because she considers that Shor’s protégé has no legitimacy. The courts have not agreed with him, but Sandu persists in not recognizing the bashkan (chief) of Gagaúzia and thereby deepens the conflict with the autonomy where a Turkic community of Orthodox religion closely linked to Russia resides.
In Transnistria, for their part, they complain about Sandu’s apparent disinterest in this territory, despite the fact that the president, who neither visits them nor negotiates with them, has also promised to buy gas for the secessionist region. Unlike Guzul, who emphasizes his special relations with Russia, the authorities of Transnistria are not eloquent in relation to the Kremlin’s war policy and avoid being involved in the conflict. In fact, the war has integrated them more into Moldova, after kyiv closed its border in the section corresponding to Transnistria. In this territory populated by Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) and Moldovans, more and more people are applying for the Moldovan passport, a document that gives them the right to vote and travel in the West and which was previously disregarded in favor of the Russian or Ukrainian passport.
“The Moldovan authorities are arrogant and in many fields incompetent. They have become bogged down in reforming the judicial system and fighting corruption. They talk about Eurointegration as if joining the European Union would solve everything,” says Vladimir Solovev, a respected analyst of Moldovan politics. “Moldova’s pro-European leaders act through bans, including the closure of critical media outlets,” he adds. For now, Shor tries to seduce the Moldovans with the promise of finding cheap gas for them and accuses Sandu of not having gone to Moscow in time for help.
