The imminent arrival of Republican Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States has fueled the debate in NATO about increasing investment in the defense of its 32 members. In 2014, the Alliance countries committed to devoting, a decade later, 2% of their GDP to military spending. Now, NATO is pressing the eight members that do not meet the agreed figure, according to several people familiar with the talks; among them, Spain, which with 1.28% of its GDP, according to Alliance data, is in the last position of investment in defense – behind Slovenia, Luxembourg and Belgium – and only plans to reach the goal in 2029.
With Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine, which since 2022 has triggered an unprecedented increase in defense spending and purchases of military equipment, and the return of Trump to the White House, who has been highly critical of frugality, NATO’s 32 allies have intensified talks on defense budgets. And the idea of setting the new spending commitment at 3% has returned to the table.
Some warn, however, that the new goal, which according to sources could be signed at the next summit in The Hague next July, if it is short-term, is unrealistic. “A gradual increase could be agreed upon, but it is more important to ensure that everyone reaches the 2% figure that had already been agreed upon and which was also recently agreed to be the spending floor and not the ceiling,” says a diplomatic source. The pressure, therefore, increases for the most austere with military spending.
Political scientist Ian Lesser of the German Marshal Fund explains that there is “considerable pressure” to go beyond the 2% target. “Future pressure from the incoming Trump Administration is a key factor, of course. But equally so is the deterioration of the security environment in and around Europe. “Geography is a factor, and some allies feel the Russian threat more acutely and directly than others,” he notes by email.
However, increasing military investment can be conflictive for many European countries. Including the large economies, France (2.06%) and Germany (2.12%), in a context of already tight budgets. And this has been indicated to the new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, allied sources say. At the same time, within the European Union (23 of its 27 members belong to NATO) formulas are being debated to increase the debt in that chapter, such as relaxing the principles of the stability pact, or launching some mutualization measure of the debt, such as Eurobonds for defense. However, there is no consensus.
Several sources from countries that do not reach the 2% marked by Wales’ commitment in 2014 acknowledge that there is some pressure, but point out that formal talks about reaching a new spending target are only beginning. “The idea of 3% is not consolidated at all,” they point out.
Spain, which has belonged to NATO since 1982, plans to reach 2% of GDP in defense in 2029. Furthermore, with extended budgets, setting increases is very difficult. Positive GDP growth can also make it difficult to increase the numbers, allied sources explain. Furthermore, Spain seeks that in this equation of commitment to allied security, NATO gives more weight to investment in the acquisition of military equipment and research and development – where it is above the average and reaches 30%, above 20%. % of Alliance commitment—and contribution to missions. Spain participates in several, for example, in the Baltic countries, in Turkey (where it also has a Patriot anti-missile battery deployed), Romania and Iraq.
“We are not prepared”
“NATO Allies agreed to invest at least 2%. At least… I can say that we are going to need much more than 2%,” Mark Rutte launched a few days ago. “Our deterrence is good for now, but I worry about tomorrow. “We are not prepared for what is coming in four or five years,” he said during a speech at Carnegie Europe.
Whoever was Dutch Prime Minister for 13 years with frugality as his hallmark is no longer sparing when he demands more investment in defense from the allies. Together with the countries closest to Russia—under greater security pressure—it leads the debate on increasing the spending floor and pressure on those who do not reach 2% of their GDP. “Prioritizing defense requires political leadership, it may be tough and risky in the short term, but it is absolutely essential in the long term,” said the Secretary General of the Alliance at the Carnegie. Rutte, however, does not want to venture up to what amount the allies should invest to be covered.
The Dutchman has already met with Trump, and with his words he is sending him signals that the Europeans will fight to maintain the transatlantic link. The Republican, until now allergic to multilateral organizations, questioned NATO’s security commitment during his first term and went so far as to assure that he would not come to the defense of those allies that did not comply with the 2% commitment. He called them “defaulters” and stated, incorrectly, that this payment is made to Washington. This year, before winning the elections, he launched another broadside against frugal states, comments that caused concern in the Alliance.
Media like Financial Times and Telegraph They have published these days that Trump wants to raise the spending commitment to 5% (more than double the current 2%) and that he will begin to demand it from European allies. Alliance sources believe, however, that it is a “utopian” figure and question whether the Republican has already reached a “serious” conclusion about the spending objective. Not even the United States comes close to that number. Poland (4.12%), followed by Estonia (3.43%), the United States (3.38%) and Latvia (3.15%) are the allies that allocate the highest percentage of their GDP to defense, which has gone increasing on average in NATO since the Russian invasion of the Ukrainian Crimean peninsula in 2014, and, later and to a greater extent, after the large-scale war.
And these figures are driven above all by the war launched by the Kremlin, which has also led to the recent entry of Finland and Sweden into the Alliance. “Clearly, for the allies in northern and eastern Europe, the risk is military and not just political,” Lesser notes. “Countries like Poland would be spending at high levels in any case given their proximity to Russia and their exposure to the fallout from the war in Ukraine,” he says. And he adds: “For others, the risk is more diffuse and perhaps more political, with concerns about the distancing of both the EU and transatlantic allies and the aspiration for greater European strategic autonomy.”
