The joint statement issued by NATO allies at the summit in Washington reveals the outline of a world moving towards a confrontation between blocs. On the one hand, the 32 Atlantic allies, the Indo-Pacific partners with whom they have close ties – Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand were again present at the NATO summit – and a handful of other like-minded democracies. On the other, the emerging bloc of authoritarian regimes: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Belarus. The geographical visualization is clear, with the authoritarian bloc established in the Eurasian mass, and the democratic bloc deployed on the margins, be it Western Europe or the Indo-Pacific zone.
The joint statement highlights this pattern because it points out, as NATO has never done before, the displeasure of the allies as a whole with the support that China gives to Russia as a “decisive collaborator” in the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine. The text warns that, if this role continues, it will have costs for China, without specifying what. “The People’s Republic of China cannot facilitate the largest war in Europe in recent history, without this having a negative impact on its interests and reputation.” The mention, of essential geopolitical importance, occurs alongside recriminations for the support that Iran and North Korea also give to Russia. China, as was to be expected, has reacted furiously to the text.
The document produced by the Atlantic allies makes it clear that they consider what is happening in the Pacific to be their concern. They stress that the connection between Beijing and other regimes with Russia is a transmission belt that increases the security threat against Europe. They also directly accuse China of malicious activities of a hybrid or cyber nature.
Multiple movements seem to feed the immense machinery of the formation of two opposing blocs. On the one hand, the attack on Ukraine has provoked a firm closing of ranks by the Atlantic democracies. The Indo-Pacific ones are also converging, extremely worried about the signals that China is sending. On the other hand, on the authoritarian side, multiple movements are detected, among them the strengthening of ties between China and Russia, with strategic declarations or the increase in trade – including products for civil-military dual use and all those that serve the Kremlin to alleviate the hardships caused by Western sanctions – or the mutual defence agreement recently signed between Moscow and Pyongyang. The authoritarian bloc does not have formal and consolidated alliances or collective structures like the democratic one, but this should not lead to underestimating its capacity for cooperation. China, for its part, also promotes networks of interaction through economic or non-military security initiatives.
The economic oxygen
Authoritarian regimes share above all the goal of reshaping the world order in a way that suits their interests best. Russia decided to pursue it by violent means. Perhaps history will clarify whether Xi Jinping knew and gave the green light to Putin’s attack on Ukraine. But what is clear is that he has not stopped this crude aggression and, on the contrary, although he does not deliver weapons, he does offer Russia the economic and manufacturing oxygen essential for the war to continue.
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Unlike Russia, China has no taint for having launched wars, but it has been sending out worrying signals for some time, with the militarisation of disputed waters, its indifference to the rulings of international courts, the crushing of democracy in Hong Kong, the development of arsenals in the dark and with no intention of agreeing on arms control measures.
Of course, the configuration of opposing blocs is not desirable, nor is it desired by all those involved. If the US is seeking to close ranks to contain the problematic rise of China, many Europeans wish to outline their own position. The attempt to forge an independent profile – not equidistant – is reasonable, but the dynamics of global events seem to lead almost irresistibly towards opposing blocs. Both, of course, are trying to garner support among the non-aligned.
The big question mark over the US presidential election in November looms over this scenario. A Trump victory would be a tremendous agitator, and the NATO summit seems to some extent an attempt to build some element of stabilisation. It is very doubtful that a new president Trump would opt for an abrupt US withdrawal from NATO. But it is likely that he would take decisions that could eviscerate it from within and, above all, undermine Ukraine’s position, cutting off the flow of aid, pushing for a negotiated solution to the war that would in all likelihood include a promise to Putin not to continue expanding NATO and a demand that kyiv give up territory. It would be a disaster.
Other stones in the shoe
Trump is not the only thorn in the side. There are others, from Viktor Orbán to Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who if they ever came to power in France would be a serious problem for NATO. It is worth remembering that the former wants to withdraw France from the integrated command of the Alliance, and the latter was still declaring in March 2022 – when Russia had already invaded Ukraine – that NATO is “a useless organisation that creates tensions” and that if he came to power he would undertake to “make France a non-aligned country”. It is reasonable to believe that this is what Mélenchon thinks, apart from tactical manoeuvres and opportunistic rhetorical changes.
Against this backdrop of uncertainty, the NATO summit has attempted to secure Ukraine’s future path, at least for a while. The allies have guaranteed another $40 billion in support for Kiev for next year, in addition to the roughly $50 billion agreed upon at the G-7 under a scheme that will use the interest on the funds frozen to Russia. There are other measures, such as the establishment of a coordinating role for NATO in military supplies and training and a war analysis centre. Meanwhile, supplies are flowing, the first F-16s are arriving in Ukraine, and anti-aircraft defences are being reinforced. All this is buying time and would allow Kiev to hold out in the first part of 2025 under Trump’s aegis. It is not insignificant, but it is insufficient. Europe is not prepared, nor will it be soon, to effectively support Kiev on its own, nor to have its own truly deterrent defence capabilities.
Beyond capabilities, there are reasons to doubt the persistence of wills. At the annual meeting of the European Council on Foreign Relations, held in Madrid at the beginning of July, the outgoing High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, said: “Would the Europeans be able to continue supporting Ukraine if the US does not do so? Certainly difficult, but not impossible. But is there the political will? I have some doubts.”
The war in Ukraine is the spearhead of the attempt to redefine the world order. There is no doubt that there are legitimate reasons to seek a redefinition of the order in many aspects. There is no doubt that the United States, the hegemonic country in that order, has committed criminal abuses in recent decades, such as the invasion of Iraq or the active role in coups d’état. Nor is there any doubt about episodes of double standards by the West. But none of this reduces by a single millimeter the imperialist bestiality that Russia commits in Ukraine, the first case in a long time in which a world power seeks to annex territory from another country, trampling on all kinds of rights and the most basic foundation of a peaceful world order: the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. None of this reduces by one iota the concern caused by the rise of regimes that unscrupulously trample on the most basic and universal individual rights. In this framework, democrats cannot remain inert or equidistant.
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