Macron offers Europe his nuclear arsenal as a deterrent weapon

France, the only atomic power in the European Union, has put on the table the use of deterrence force to also protect its partners. President Emmanuel Macron believes that his nuclear weapon is “an unavoidable element” in the defense of Europe and has offered to open a reflection. In Germany, whose security has been supported since the post-world war by the umbrella of the United States, this debate is beginning to make its way in the face of the Russian threat and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House.

In recent days, Macron has multiplied his statements about the “European dimension” of nuclear deterrence, a hallmark of the presidential Fifth Republic and life insurance for a country then chastened by the disaster caused by the German invasion of 1940. In France it is the head of state, elected by direct universal suffrage, who controls the nuclear button and who, with his words, guarantees the credibility of the weapon before the enemies. Hence, when it comes to the bomb, every word of the president, every silence, is scrutinized in detail.

In a speech on April 25, Macron defined nuclear deterrence as “an unavoidable element of the defense of the European continent.” On the 26th he declared to the EBRA press group: “The French doctrine is that you can use [el arma] when our vital interests are threatened. And there is a European dimension to these vital interests.” In an interview published last Thursday by the weekly The EconomistHe stated: “By the nature of our vital interests and our decisions, our geography, we contribute to the credibility of European defense.”

The novelty of Macron’s statements is relative. Since General De Gaulle, French presidents have defended the existence of vital shared interests between France and its neighbors. Macron said in 2022: “Our nuclear forces contribute, by their very existence, to the security of France and Europe.” What is new is the context: the war in Ukraine and Trump’s renewed threats to leave Europe if he wins in November, which makes the partners more receptive to the French proposal.

The campaign for the European elections in June adds a national key, with criticism from the radical left to the extreme right. “We touch [con esta cuestión] to the very nerve of French sovereignty, national sovereignty,” François-Xavier Bellamy, leader of the moderate right, said on the Europe 1 network. “A French head of state should not say this.” “He had announced it, he denied it, he lied,” declared Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally. “Emmanuel Macron wants to share our nuclear deterrent with the European Union.”

But neither Macron nor his predecessors have talked about “sharing” the weapon, according to Bruno Tertrais, an expert at the Foundation for Strategic Research think tank and author of Pax atomic? Theory, practice and limits of deterrence (Pax atomic? Theory, practice and limits of deterrence). “There is a difference between protecting and sharing,” Tertrais explained to France 5. “There has never been a question of sharing the decision on the use of French nuclear forces, ever, nor of sharing the nuclear budget between France and Germany, as they say. some”.

2% of the world’s arsenal

French deterrence is based on an airborne component and an oceanic component. The journalist Jean-Dominique Merchet tells it in another recently published book, Sommes-nous prêts pour la guerre? The illusion of French puissance (Are we prepared for war? The illusion of French power). The ocean force consists of four nuclear submarines, at least one of which is at sea. The airborne force consists of Rafale aircraft with missiles. France, according to data from the Swedish SIPRI institute cited in the book, had 290 nuclear warheads in 2021, 2% of the world’s arsenal, 90% of which is in the hands of Russia and the United States.

During a recent conversation, Merchet imagined a scenario in which France would make 20 nuclear missiles available to Poland. They would settle in a Polish base. Paris would remain in control. “It’s not science fiction,” says the author, “it’s exactly what the Americans have been doing since the 1950s with Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey.” Now, he adds, “proposing this cannot be done just like that.” He would demand to do so within the framework of NATO and would force France to join the so-called Nuclear Plans Group, from which it is now absent.

“This is not about replacing the Americans, this is absurd,” analyzes Merchet, referring to the hypothesis of a French nuclear umbrella extended to Europe. “It’s about offering it to our allies, although the main insurance will continue to be the United States. It’s about telling the allies: ‘The world is complicated, with Trump you don’t know, and we offer the possibility of complementary insurance.'” “I think,” says the journalist, “that France should propose it to its European allies, especially Germany, Poland or others.”

It’s a debate that a Trump victory in November could fuel. In February, the former US president said that, in a conversation with a European leader, he threatened to strip him of US protection – and would even encourage Russia to attack him – if he did not increase his contributions to NATO. He can be understood as one more of his outbursts and nothing indicates that Washington is going to leave Europe; Trump did not do it in his previous term. But in countries like Germany, a future without the US nuclear umbrella is a hypothesis that is not taken lightly.

In a newspaper article Frankfurter Allgemeine, Finance Minister and Liberal leader Christian Lindner asked: “Under what political and financial conditions would Paris and London be willing to maintain or expand their strategic capabilities for collective security? And what contribution are we willing to make? When the peace and freedom of Europe is at stake, we must not avoid these difficult questions.” The Minister of Defense, the social democrat Boris Pistorius, described it as “frivolous” to open this debate on the basis of statements by Trump.

But something is changing, according to specialist François Heisbourg, senior advisor at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Until now, when the French said they were willing to talk about what [el ex primer ministro] Alain Juppé called ‘concerted deterrence’, Germany’s absence of interest was total, absolute,” he commented after hearing the reactions in Berlin to Trump’s words. Today is another world. That of Russian President Vladimir Putin, that of Trump. “For the first time, it is being discussed at a higher political level,” Heisbourg said. “Maybe a real argument will start.”

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