Israel has not come this far to repeat what it did in 2006, leaving Hezbollah alive and even able to “sell” victory to its supporters after the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Today, the extremist government led by Benjamin Netanyahu is determined to strike the Shiite militia with the intention of wiping it off the map.
Just as in the occupied Palestinian territories it seeks to eliminate Hamas politically and militarily, in Lebanon it seeks to settle the score that has been pending for 18 years, using all its military potential. A potential that, in open disregard for international law, includes sophisticated attacks such as those this week, selective assassinations and aerial bombardments in a supposedly sovereign state (where are the Lebanese Armed Forces?).
Seen in this light, and given that Hezbollah will not easily surrender its weapons, Tel Aviv’s war script dictates that the next step be taken: launching a ground offensive in southern Lebanon. The picture is now practically complete, since the cyber assassinations have succeeded not only in killing or incapacitating hundreds of commanders and fighters of the Party of God, but also in spreading panic and disarray in its ranks, significantly reducing its ability to coordinate its forces in the event of a possible ground attack. On the one hand, Netanyahu now maintains that the objective of the war is to return to their homes the 80,000 Israelis who fled in the face of the militia’s rocket and missile launches. And, on the other, the IDF has already deployed units in line along the common border, ready to launch the attack imminently, together with an air force that enjoys overwhelming superiority from the start in the face of its enemy’s poor anti-aircraft defense capabilities. All that is missing is the order to attack.
At this point, it remains to be seen whether the militant response or the Israeli attack will come first. It is as tragic as it is obvious that Hezbollah will respond, although, given the collapse of its internal communication systems, it will not be easy for it to go beyond the launching of a few dozen devices (barely effective against Israeli anti-aircraft systems). Going further, with incursions into Israeli soil by its elite forces (such as the Radwan brigade) to capture prisoners and destroy some targets, is a task that not only takes time, but may trigger an escalation that, deep down, Hassan Nasrallah cannot rationally desire given the possibility of receiving an unbearable punishment from such a superior enemy.
More likely, Israel, intent on immediately exploiting the “success” it has achieved with its cyber-assassinations, will decide to complete the coup by openly entering Lebanese territory, unleashing a full-scale offensive, like those it carried out in 1978 and 1982. Although it knows that Lebanese fighters have been preparing for years with all kinds of traps and stratagems to fight in a territory they know better than the IDF, it calculates that its technological superiority will allow it to “cleanse” southern Lebanon (without ruling out that this will be followed by a new territorial occupation). Aware of this vital danger, it should not be ruled out that Hezbollah, knowing that a large part of the Israeli effort will be focused on eliminating its artillery arsenals, will decide to preempt the coup by using the bulk of its arsenals with the intention of saturating the Israeli defense before seeing them destroyed.
The regional explosion is on the way, with Iran also preparing its response and Israel on a violent course doomed to failure. Is there anyone capable of stopping Netanyahu today, convinced that Biden will bow his head and that Nasrallah has no suicidal inclinations?
