In the small town of Voru, in the southeast of Estonia, militarization at a forced pace is evident. Its citizens have become accustomed to the presence of British, French and American soldiers in its bars and military trucks driving through its cobblestone streets. The enemy, Russia, is only 30 kilometers away. And the fear of a possible invasion, which the Estonian authorities do not rule out at all, is increasingly reaching out to the population. Proof of this is that many of the 12,000 inhabitants of Voru have their cars parked with a full tank of fuel and a suitcase with the essentials in case they have to flee suddenly.
Very close by, at the Taara military base, Mati Tikerpuu, commander of one of the two brigades of the Baltic country’s army, highlights that, in the event of an enemy incursion, his intention would be to “deal with the invaders as soon as possible.” “We would fight on the first terrain suitable for it,” the colonel details in the Officers’ Club, who on his uniform wears a patch with the Estonian flag along with another with that of Ukraine. In addition to being the headquarters of the infantry brigade led by Tikerpuu, the Taara base has a recruit training center – military service is mandatory for men in Estonia – and hosts rotating troops from the United Kingdom, the United States and France, the three nuclear powers of NATO.
Russia’s war in Ukraine and, particularly, the massacres of civilians have resurrected the traumas of Stalinism and fear of Kremlin expansionism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the only three former Soviet republics integrated into the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. And it is in this area of the continent where NATO’s credibility is most threatened. In the first months of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, launched in February 2022, the Russian army occupied 120,000 square kilometers, almost triple the size of Estonia (which has an area comparable to Switzerland, the Netherlands or Denmark).
The vulnerable situation of the Baltic republics – three allies, especially threatened by Russia, that lack strategic depth and have very limited armies – has forced NATO to reconfigure its defense strategy for the region in the last 24 months. Under the provisions in force in 2022, in the event of an invasion, enemy troops would occupy part of the territory before being repelled by a multinational force in an operation that could last several months. At last year’s Alliance summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, new plans were adopted to “defend every inch” of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as an increased presence of Allied troops in the region.
“We would be able to resist an invasion for a couple of weeks,” Tikerpuu estimates, “enough until allied reinforcements arrive.” The colonel admits to Morning Express, during a trip organized by the Estonian Ministry of Defense, that a large part of the 19,000 soldiers that Russia had in 2022 a few kilometers from Estonia are now—or have died—in Ukraine. Even so, Estonian intelligence services stated in a recent report that Moscow plans to increase troops near its border to almost 40,000 in the coming years.
Estonia has only 4,500 professional soldiers, plus 40,000 reservists. Despite having raised defense spending above 3.5% of GDP (one of the highest percentages among the allies), its army does not have a single tank—much less a combat aircraft—. And its population (1.3 million inhabitants) is comparable to the number of soldiers in the Russian Armed Forces (according to official figures).
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“Shadow War”
The relationship between Tallinn and Moscow has deteriorated deeply in the last decade. In September 2014, coinciding with the NATO summit in Wales, which was discussing plans to protect Eastern allies after the illegal annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, an Estonian police officer was kidnapped at the border—in of NATO—by agents of the Russian Federal Security Service. Finally, he was exchanged for a Kremlin spy, but since then the Estonian authorities have denounced countless “hybrid warfare attacks”: sabotage on underwater cables, interference with the GPS signal, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks…
Kaja Kallas, the Estonian prime minister, insists that Russia is waging a “shadow war” against the West. The liberal politician, who aspires to succeed Josep Borrell as high representative for EU Foreign and Security Policy, has emerged as one of the main hawks in Brussels, where she urges the approval of even tougher sanctions against Moscow. Kallas, accustomed to being labeled a warmonger for demanding the rearmament of Europe and the sending of much more military aid to Ukraine, was declared wanted last February by the Russian authorities.
In Luhamaa, one of the four border posts between community territory and Russia that remain open, dozens of truck drivers and a few families in private vehicles suffer the consequences of the tension between Estonia and its gigantic neighbor. They try to be patient while the customs line remains motionless. Vehicles cross in dribs and drabs; Some wait there for many hours, others have to spend several days there until their turn comes. Estonian agents carefully inspect the merchandise of each truck, almost all of them registered in Serbia or Central Asian countries (Russia does not allow the circulation of those with European plates). On a good day, when there are not too many obstacles from the other side, about 60 vehicles cross. “The Russians stopped answering our phones in April 2022,” summarizes Peter Maran, head of the border guard.
Around Luhamaa, Estonia is erecting a robust border fence that will be equipped with cameras, sensors and radars. In addition to the construction of the wall, which will be completed next year, the planning of a network of 60 bunkers along the 294 kilometers that separate the country from Russia is added. At the end of May, Norway, Finland, Poland and the three Baltic countries agreed to create a coordinated drone system along their eastern borders. A couple of days earlier, Russian border guards removed 25 buoys marking the boundary along the Narva River in the north from Estonian waters.
In addition to doubling military spending, Estonia is one of the allies that has donated the most aid to Ukraine (1.7% of its GDP). In the Estonian Ministry of Defense, there is a majority of those who consider that countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain must make a greater effort to prevent the Kremlin from achieving its objectives in Ukraine. Mark Riisik, deputy director of the Department of Political Planning, expresses his concern about the West’s inability to produce artillery ammunition at the rate needed by the Ukrainian army. Riisik emphasizes that the EU failed in its promise to supply kyiv with one million howitzers in 2023, while Russia will produce 4.5 million this year and receives huge quantities from North Korea.
Different Western intelligence services agree on the possibility of Russia attacking a NATO member between the next 5 and 10 years. They do not contemplate the option of invading an entire country, but rather a land operation in which a strip of land is occupied to test the principle of collective defense, the cornerstone of the transatlantic organization. Lieutenant Colonel Meelis Vilippus, head of the International Cooperation Section of the Estonian Defense Forces, believes that Russia will maintain “the imperialist attitude that it has never renounced since the 17th century” if it is not defeated in Ukraine. “They could attack us in two or three years,” predicts Vilippus. “We are the new Maginot line,” he says.
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