The skirmish between India and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 is often called ‘watershed moments’ in the history of bilateral relations. For the first time in four decades, soldiers lost their lives in an encounter on the border between these two countries. After a year, some equations have changed but the tension has not eased. Rather, the competition and dilemma between both parties has increased. This is clearly visible in five ways.
Firstly, what was the outcome of 13 months of confrontation and 11 rounds of talks – both sides have only partially left the area of Pangong Lake. The standoff continues in eastern Ladakh, and the two sides want to hold talks with completely different objectives.
India wants a military withdrawal, and the fear of war gradually subsides, but China wants the opposite. He wants the possibility of war to subside, followed by a military withdrawal. It is like putting a cart before a horse. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s diplomatic maneuver is behind this insistence of China.
China will not agree if there is no reason for the agreement
In April, a brief and blunt statement came from China. It asked India to “enjoy the current state of de-escalation and peace” around the border, an indication that it did not wish to restore the status quo in April 2020. Meanwhile, Indian sources told the media that the PLA’s stance has become as rigid as before.
The situation in eastern Ladakh shows the limits and shortcomings of China’s military audacity. But given the current situation, unless the Chinese leadership believes that it has sufficient reason to compromise, it is not going to budge.
Second, due to the continuing standoff, the political trust between the two countries is being broken. This will also have an impact on future negotiations.
Even before the skirmishes of Galvan Valley, the diplomatic section of India considered the rise of China as a challenge for India. Apart from this, surveys showed that the attitude of Indians towards China was never very positive. It is slowly getting worse. In 2019, only 23 percent of the people were fans of China. After the battle of Galwan, common people and merchant communities also happily participated in the campaign to boycott Chinese goods. This unhappiness may not increase further, but its level is expected to remain intact.
India and China both believe they are threatened by each other
Importantly, India’s military planners are relieved that China’s threat is being felt at the public level. On the other hand, this is the first time in China after the fifties and sixties that India is being described as a threat in the mainstream media.
In February 2021, China publicly acknowledged that four of its soldiers were killed in the skirmishes in the Galvan Valley. It was somewhat unusual though. After this the media was allowed to glorify these soldiers. For example, in early April it was reported that these soldiers would be honored at the Qingming Festival. Earlier this week a conversation with Ki Fabao was broadcast on China’s national broadcaster CCTV. Fabao is the regimental commander of the PLA’s Jinjiang Military Command. He was said to have suffered a head injury during the Galwan clash.
China considers itself the world’s biggest economic power
Third, the nationalist wave is taking hold in the Chinese media. This is the result of domestic level discussions. Xi Jinpin has emerged as a big leader, but there is a conflict about it too. As a result, the party is placing double emphasis on nationalism and ideology. It is being reiterated time and again at the government level that self-reliance and political loyalty should be maintained. Territorial integrity and sovereignty should be maintained. China’s politico-economic system is the best and cold war-like competition with the West should continue.
Simultaneously, Xi rose to power unmatched after Mao Zedong, which cemented top-level design in foreign policy. This reduced the scope for feedback in foreign policy and also the possibilities of change.
All this happened when China sees itself as a global economy that has no connections. According to him, it is absolutely essential in the global economy and it should play an important role in shaping the international order.
Since China sees itself as a major power, can pose a threat and is constantly increasing military capability, it becomes risky for it to use its power.
How China views India’s approach to the West
Fourth, policy makers in India took a clear stance, balancing with the US and other partner countries. It emphasized that border disputes cannot be viewed in isolation from other aspects of bilateral relations. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has reiterated this point only last month. He said that India has every right to increase its strength. It also reminded that “tension along the border and coordination in other areas cannot continue under any circumstances.”
Last year, China has expressed anger over these proposals. India is turning west and China is seeing it in terms of its diplomatic competition with the US and the territorial conflict between India and China. Yet Chinese analysts are divided on the extent to which India and the US can harmonize their interests and aspirations.
China’s argument on the border dispute is that the issue “is buried at the bottom of history and should find its proper place in bilateral relations.” Thus, China does not accept that its actions in eastern Ladakh have damaged bilateral relations, or that it really wants to rethink its policy.
Willingness to reduce economic dependence on China
China has emphasized its manufacturing capacity, which it believes plays a key role in worldwide supply chains and is vital to trade relations. In this way, China believes that it is very important for India as an economic partner. Of course, India-China trade relations have flourished despite the COVID-19 pandemic and tensions in Ladakh in dollar terms. But it would also be foolish to think that this should not happen. Because complete economic disintegration is neither possible, nor should it be expected.
Yes, of course, that India’s policy makers aspire to reduce economic dependence on China, that too in critical areas.
The recent decision to keep China out of India’s 5G ecosystem is an example of this. But in such a situation, it should also be noted that flexibility and alternative capacity building cannot be done in a hurry. Of course, political will is visible, yet it will take time, and it remains to be seen to what extent we succeed.
What steps will India and China take?
Fifth, in spite of all this, the geography between the two countries and their ambitions have been working to prepare the structural equation. As neighbours, both have no other choice. This decides which step both will take.
Last year, the audacity of the PLA indicated that the status quo was not going to be maintained along the disputed border for the past few decades. On the other hand, India’s favorable position in the Indian Ocean region and China’s increasing steps there have created a new dynamic between the two countries.
Common Interest
Along with this, there are many such areas where the interests of both are common. Like India has always been careful in commenting on China’s policy on Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang. Be it Taiwan or the matter of investigating the origin of Kovid-19, India has always maintained restraint.
Despite border tensions, China and India have been working together in forums like BRICS and SCO.
Recently, BRICS foreign ministers in their statement on the multilateral system said that they want to establish a “more fair and inclusive, representative international order based on international law and the United Nations Charter. Take care of the sovereignty of all countries, respect their territorial integrity and interests and concerns.
Road Ahead
It is noteworthy that India believes in such things and supports the vague concept of ‘rule based system’ of Quad. Similarly, there are similarities between India and China on the issues of world trade and climate change.
Nevertheless, there will be mutual coordination in this regard only on certain issues and it will be based on practicality.
Yes, neither of these will make the two countries competitive with each other. If Xi Jinping is ready to change China’s attitude towards India, especially on the border issue, it may change to some extent. Still, relying on hope is not a good policy.