The bloc formed by Iran and its allied groups in the Middle East has suffered numerous setbacks over the last year in the face of Israel’s growing offensive on several fronts. Hamas, which launched the October 7 assault from Gaza, is greatly weakened and has lost its main leaders to Israeli hands; the Lebanese Hezbollah has also shown that it is vulnerable and has been left without its top leader; The Iraqi militias still do not fully enter the turbulent scene. Tehran has also measured its response in clashes with Israel to avoid an even greater escalation.
In the midst of these coups, a group that until a year ago occupied a peripheral position in this alliance has gained prominence: they are the Houthis. The Yemeni movement quickly entered the fray against Israel following the offensive on Gaza, and has exhibited great ability to internationalize the conflict with attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea, while avoiding serious damage to its ranks. Furthermore, with its bombings against Israel, it has become stronger and more popular and is gaining greater centrality in the regional alliance.
Its most disruptive actions have been those aimed at disrupting circulation in the Red Sea, one of the main commercial arteries in the world. Between last November and mid-October, the group carried out some 240 attacks on ships in the area, according to conflict data collection organization ACLED. And with this it has managed to sink maritime movement through this route by almost 75%, according to data from the Portwatch platform.
The deployment of naval forces in the region, especially the United States, and the American and British bombings against Houthi targets in Yemen, have limited the scope of their attacks, intercepted around half of the time, according to data from ACLED. But they have not reduced the pace of the group’s offensives, which has taken advantage of the experience to refine its operations and has used its impact to project its capacity for movement.
In parallel, the Houthi militia has also attacked Israel; Since October of last year, 36 actions have been attributed, according to ACLED (13 of them in the first two months and another 12 since Israel intensified its offensive against Lebanon). In July, the group hit Tel Aviv in a drone attack that killed a civilian. The Israeli retaliation included two attacks against critical infrastructure in Yemen in which around 20 people died, which has also failed to stop them.
Within Yemen, where they control around 30% of the territory (equivalent to around 75% of the population, including the capital Sana’a), the war in Gaza has offered them respite. Before October 2023, the Houthis were grappling with weariness from the long civil war and growing internal opposition. But the benefits of the conflict with Israel have allowed them to cement their authority, intensify repression, including against UN workers, and rekindle their fight with the rival government recognized by the international community and its great regional supporter, Saudi Arabia.
“The war in Gaza occurred when there was a lot of criticism in Yemen of the Houthi administration. People suffered from a devastating economic situation, from living conditions, high unemployment; All of this put enormous pressure on the Houthis,” says Middle East security analyst Shukriya Bradost. “Attention is now focused on the Houthis [en cambio] in the war against Israel and the United States,” he states.
At the same time, the Houthis have taken the opportunity to expand their international presence, especially by assuming a greater role within the axis of groups supported by Iran. Furthermore, its leader, Abdelmalik al Huthi, has emerged as a new symbol while leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah have been eliminated by Israel.
“This change reflects a growing transnational mentality among Houthi supporters, who now see the movement as a force with influence far beyond Yemen,” says Mohammed Albasha, a Middle East security expert. Its military strength and presence in the region has grown significantly, he notes. Thus, they have accessed new advanced technology and weapons from Iran, in part displayed during attacks on Israel, although the group has claimed to have – and on occasion use – more sophisticated weapons than those it has shown, such as hypersonic missiles. The Houthis have also recruited thousands of fighters in the last year.
The open fight with Israel and the setbacks suffered by other groups supported by Tehran raise the question of how far the Yemeni rebels can go. More than 2,000 kilometers separate them from Israel, they control a vast and rugged territory and they have two decades of almost uninterrupted military experience: first against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, overthrown after the 2011 revolution, during the Arab Spring, and then during the civil war that has bled the country since 2014, in which regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have come face to face.
“Years of asymmetric warfare with the central government and the Saudi-led coalition have turned them into a resilient force, expert in guerrilla tactics. Their military infrastructure is decentralized, with fuel depots distributed throughout northern Yemen, their brigades operating as mobile units, and missile and drone launch bases spread across different provinces, which makes them agile and difficult to attack,” he points out. Albasha.
Taking advantage of their location next to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, two of Washington’s largest regional allies and increasingly closer to Israel, the Houthis have warned that they do not rule out hitting them directly if they assist the United States and Israel in some way. Yemeni rebels have attacked Saudi Arabia and the Emirates several times in the past, including at oil facilities and airports.
In the last year, the actions of the Houthis have also contributed to reinforcing their image as a determined, self-conscious and to some extent reckless group compared to Iran, Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias, which have tended to act more cautiously. Although they are an equally strategic actor and guided mainly by local causes, the Houthis have withstood the blows from Israel and the United States, and have responded immediately, without taking into account the consequences of an escalation.
“Their goal remains to consolidate power in their territory rather than control [incluso] all of Yemen. But the Houthis seem willing to engage in greater confrontation, as they perceive regional opportunities and existential threats,” highlights Albasha, who slips that “their will to escalate makes them a highly unpredictable force.”